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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











CAMBRIA COUNTY PRISON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER HALE; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CASHOFF; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 
LEVERKNIGHT; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JOHN DOE #1; CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICER JOHN DOE #2; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JOHN DOE 
#3;CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JOHN DOE #4; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER LT. 
JOHN DOE #5; CITY OF EBENSBURG 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-00021) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 







                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Robert Fennell, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from a District 
Court order granting the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
 As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our conclusions.  On October 29, 
2010, Fennell, a state prisoner serving a 20 to 40 year sentence, was temporarily housed 
at the Cambria County Prison in Ebensburg, Pennsylvania.  At approximately 8:30 a.m., 
Corrections Officers Hale and Leverknight were in a dayroom preparing to transport 
Fennell to the prison yard.  Officer Hale noticed that Fennell’s restraint belt, which 
secures an inmate’s hands to his waist, was unfastened.  Officer Hale tackled Fennell to 
the ground.  Officer Leverknight and other officers, whose names Fennell did not know, 
arrived to help restrain him.  Fennell claimed that he was then taken to a cell, where he 
was placed on the floor, assaulted further, stripped of his clothes, and then “[f]elt hands 
rubbing his butt and he jumped.”  In an affidavit, Fennell explained that during this 
incident someone “place[d] I believe a finger in my butt.”  Fennell also asserted that he 
was denied medical care after the incidents.  Later that day, Fennell was transferred back 
to SCI–Houtzdale.      
 In February 2012, Fennell filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging, inter alia, that corrections officers used excessive force against him and were 
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deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.1  The defendants moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that Fennell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
and that there were no genuine issues of material fact.  The matter was referred to a 
Magistrate Judge, who recommended denying as unexhausted Fennell’s claims pertaining 
to the assault that occurred when he was taken to a cell and his allegations regarding the 
denial of medical care.  In a supplemental Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate 
Judge recommended denying the remaining claims concerning the initial assault in the 
dayroom.  After viewing a video of that incident, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 
excessive force was not used.  Over Fennell’s objections, the District Court adopted the 
Reports and Recommendations, and granted the motion for summary judgment.  Fennell 
filed a timely notice of appeal.2  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review of a 
District Court’s order granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same 
                                              
1 Fennell also raised claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution, and he named as defendants Corrections Officer Cashoff, several other 
unnamed corrections officers, the Borough of Ebensburg, the City of Philadelphia, and 
Cambria County Prison.  The Magistrate Judge recommended the dismissal of these 
claims and defendants.  Fennell did not object, and the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.  Fennell does not challenge these conclusions in his 
brief.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFLCIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 
F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
2 Fennell also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  We 
lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Fennell’s motion for reconsideration because he 
did not file a separate notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal, from the order 
denying that motion.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); United States v. McGlory, 202 
F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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standard as the District Court.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-
23 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 The core inquiry of an excessive-force claim is ‘“whether force was applied in a 
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm.”’  Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).  In conducting that inquiry, we examine the need for 
the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, 
the extent of injury inflicted, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, and 
any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response.  See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 
102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).  Fennell argues that the Magistrate Judge “ignored the fact that 
[he] was already cuffed before the first assault.”  Even if Fennell were handcuffed, 
however, it does not automatically follow that the use of force on him was excessive.  
The Magistrate Judge concluded, based in part on a review of a videotape of the incident 
in the dayroom, that Fennell’s hands were not secured to his restraint belt, that he is a 
large person (6’5” and 285 lbs.) with a violent history, that he “crouche[d] lower and 
widen[ed] his stance” when Office Hale approached him, that the officers did not strike 
Fennell, and that, other than favoring his right leg as he walked out of the camera’s view, 
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Fennell appeared to be in no stress after he was restrained.  Although Fennell offered 
affidavits from other prisoners in support of his account of what happened in the 
dayroom, the District Court properly relied on the videotape of the incident to resolve any 
factual disputes.  See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties 
tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for 
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); see also Shreve v. Franklin 
Cnty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating “that witness accounts seeking to 
contradict an unambiguous video recording do not create a triable issue.”).  Fennell also 
claims that the videotape of the dayroom incident was “altered,” but he does not 
specifically describe how the events depicted on the videotape differ from what actually 
occurred.  See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81.  Therefore, the District Court properly denied 
Fennell’s claim that Officers Hale and Leverknight used excessive force in the dayroom.   
 Fennell also claims that the District Court erred in concluding that he failed to 
exhaust his remaining claims.3  The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an 
                                              
3 The Appellees claim that Fennell did not raise in his Informal Brief a challenge to the 
District Court’s conclusion that he failed to exhaust prison administrative remedies.  See 
Appellees’ Br., 19.  Although “an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his 
opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal[,]” United States v. Pelullo, 399 
F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005), we must liberally construe Fennell’s filings.  See, e.g., 
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003).  Here, we conclude that Fennell’s 
Informal Brief, liberally construed, fairly raises a challenge the District Court’s 
exhaustion determination.  See Appellant’s Informal Brief, 1, 5 (alleging error with 
Magistrate Judge's June 28, 2013 report and recommendation, which itself held that his 
cell assault claim was unexhausted; requesting that we reverse and remand the case back 
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inmate from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional conduct 
by prison officials “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  “Proper exhaustion” is required to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement, see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006), and a procedurally defective 
administrative grievance precludes action in federal court.  See id. at 90-91; Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was 
intended to allow “corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints 
internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.”  Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 
516, 525 (2002).   
 Fennell submitted two grievance forms.4  On the first form, Fennell stated that 
“[on] [October 29, 2010] [w]hile at your Jail the [correctional officers] assaulted me and 
others helped later.”  On the second form, Fennell wrote that “I was assaulted by several 
Correctional Officer’s [sic] at Cambria County Jail and now I want to file charge’s [sic] 
on them.”  Although neither grievance is detailed, Cambria County Prison’s Grievance 
                                                                                                                                                  
to the lower court). 
 
4 Fennell used forms supplied by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) 
because he was incarcerated at SCI–Houtzdale when he filed the grievance.  Cambria 
County Prison did not reply directly to Fennell, but he was advised that the DOC’s Office 
of Special Investigations and Intelligence had reviewed his grievance, concluded it lacked 
merit, and stated that no action would be taken.  Fennell received another response 
indicating that his grievance had been forwarded to the Cambria County Prison.  Based 
on this record, the District Court essentially concluded that Fennell substantially 
complied with Cambria County Prison’s Grievance Procedures.  See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 




Procedures provide only a general requirement that a grievance “detail[] the problem, the 
informal process used and the remedy being sought.”  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 
218 (2007) (“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance 
procedures will vary . . . but it is the prison’s requirements . . . that define the boundaries 
of proper exhaustion.”).  Fennell’s grievance forms indicate that he was “assaulted,” and 
nothing in those forms indicates that he was limiting his claim to the events that occurred 
in the dayroom.  In fact, Fennell’s reference in the first grievance form to “others 
help[ing] later” indicates that he was complaining about both the dayroom assault and the 
subsequent assault the cell.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was error for 
the District Court to find that Fennell failed to exhaust his claims concerning the assault 
that occurred in the cell after the incident in the dayroom.  See Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 
646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002) (“When the administrative rulebook is silent, a grievance 
suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought. . . . 
All the grievance need do is object intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming.”). 
 The District Court properly held, however, that Fennell failed to exhaust his claim 
regarding the denial of medical care.  Fennell did not raise the denial of medical care in 
his grievances, and his allegations of assault in those grievances do not fairly encompass 
a claim that he was not treated for his injuries.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Fennell’s medical care claim to the extent that is based on his failure to exhaust 
prison administrative remedies.  
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the 
matter to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
